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Summary 
 
The Eurozone crisis has radically reshaped the inner structures of the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU). The economic pillar of the construct, in particular, has undergone an 
unprecedented metamorphosis. Reforms such as the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance (TSCG), the Six-Pack, or the Two-Pack have brought about a new regime of 
economic governance in the Eurozone and have dramatically changed the ways economic, 
fiscal and social policies are being conducted in the currency union. These changes, which 
constitute the object of this doctoral research, beg many questions of a constitutional nature, as 
to the power relationships between the European Union (EU) and the Member States in the 
Eurozone, the institutional equilibria at the supranational level, the ability of law to constrain 
political and economic power, or the place of the individual in the integration project. The main 
ambition of this research has been to determine if, and to what extent, the new economic 
governance of the Eurozone adheres to the founding constitutional guarantees of the EU legal 
order, namely those drawn from the rule of law principle. In so doing, it has answered the 
following research question: in its post-crisis version, does the economic and budgetary 
governance framework of the Eurozone live up to the EU’s constitutional commitment to the 
rule of law? In order to do so, this doctoral thesis has proceeded in a three-step process.  
 
Part I elaborated on the analytical framework on which the thesis relied to conduct its 
assessment of post-crisis economic governance in the Eurozone. It came clear with the 
understanding of the rule of law it favored: a teleological approach (informed by the main 
purposes pursued by the concept, namely the prevention of arbitrariness and the generation of 
trust), adjusted to the specific context of the EU (the ‘EU rule of law’). From there, four ‘rule 
of law’ benchmarks were identified: compliance with vertical separation of powers and the 
competence allocation system of the Treaties; internal quality of substantive rules; the 
availability of external review; and the sustainability of fundamental rights. 
 
Part II provided a clear understanding of the new economic governance of the Eurozone. 
Chapter 1 offered an in-depth overview of the many substantive, procedural and institutional 
changes introduced by the various reforms adopted in the field of economic policy in the 
aftermath of the crisis. Chapter 2 made sense of these changes from a governance perspective. 
It showed how the Eurocrisis brought about a new type of EU intervention in the field of 
economic policy, based on a vertical, substantive and harmonizing type of policy coordination.  
 
 Part III assessed the new economic governance of the Eurozone in the light of the ‘rule of law’ 
framework previously elaborated. 
 
Chapter 1 appraised the new economic governance of the Eurozone in the light of the 
competence allocation system of the Union and its underlying principle of conferral. It found 
that the advent of a new economic governance framework in the Eurozone was not 
irreconcilable with that system, but rather materialized the spirit of purposive openness and 
contextual adaptability of the Treaty provisions on economic policy. It also warned that the EU 
legislator had reached the outer edge of what is constitutionally feasible and that any further 
consolidation of the economic pillar would require Treaty revision. 
 
Chapter 2 conducted a qualitative assessment of the main policy rules underlying the new 
economic governance of the Eurozone. It found that they suffer from serious qualitative flaws, 
pertaining to their complexity, their opacity, their internal inconsistency, and the unconstrained 
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discretion that the Commission enjoys as their main enforcer. It argued that the system’s 
reliance on policy rules had become excessive and counter-productive, as it now works against 
the objectives of certainty and stability that it was supposed to achieve, instills distrust and 
facilitates arbitrariness. Hence, it highlighted the pressing need for an overhaul of the existing 
policy rules and a deeper institutional reflection about the legitimacy of the rules-based 
approach to economic and fiscal governance. 
 
Chapter 3 investigated the availability of external review under the new economic governance 
of the Eurozone. It showed that, so far, the transformation of the EU’s powers in the economic 
and fiscal fields did not come together with a parallel intensification of judicial scrutiny by the 
Court of Justice. It also found that, considering the Court’s current case law and the conceptual 
frameworks that continue to structure its action, a shift in approach is quite unlikely. The result 
is a profound disconnect between the evolving nature of law and governance in the realm of 
EU economic policy and its judicial apprehension by the Court of Justice, an inappropriate 
level of review and a widening accountability gap. Chapter 3 noted that several bodies (such 
as the Court of Auditors or the European Fiscal Board) sought to instill a certain dose of review, 
without compensating the lack of judicial review however. Chapter 3 finally enjoined the Court 
to lift the constitutional uncertainty produced by the new economic governance of the 
Eurozone, to come to terms with what standard economic governance has progressively 
become and to make sure that supranational judicial scrutiny keeps up with the evolving powers 
of the EU. 
 
Finally, Chapter 4 analyzed the question of fundamental rights sustainability under economic 
governance in the post-crisis era. In this Chapter, the core finding was that of a fundamental 
discrepancy between the evolution of post-crisis economic governance towards a more 
constraining and supra-nationally driven system of harmonization and the institutional position 
of fundamental rights. Under the current configuration, that system’s ability to impact levels 
of rights protection in a systemic manner is not matched with equivalent safeguards. In spite 
of its clear applicability and multiple references in the relevant legislation, the body of EU 
fundamental rights only plays a peripheral role in the various policy-making processes making 
up standard economic governance. Rights mainstreaming is close to non-existent, and the 
Charter does not guide or constrain policy deliberation in any meaningful way. Moreover, there 
is no sign that external reviewers (either the Court of Justice or the Fundamental Rights 
Agency) are ready to redress these deficiencies. 
 
Overall, it flows from these findings that the transformation of Eurozone economic governance 
in the aftermath of the Eurocrisis, and its shift from one coordination model to another, has not 
been accompanied by a parallel and consonant adjustment of its ‘rule of law’ settlement. For 
each one of the analytical criteria, I noted certain evolutions, but of a clearly insufficient 
magnitude to found the new economic governance of the Eurozone on the solid constitutional 
guarantees it needs. On the contrary, it was observed that, whereas economic and fiscal 
governance decidedly moved away from the pre-crisis pattern of coordination, the 
constitutional settlement on which that pre-crisis model relied has been perpetuated without 
any meaningful redefinition nor any upgrade of its ‘rule of law’ credentials. As a result, the 
crisis and its aftermath have brought about significant discrepancies, opened wide ‘rule of law’ 
gaps and has led to a paradoxical misalignment between what economic governance has 
become today and its constitutional foundations. The new economic governance of the 
Eurozone thus fails to live up to the Union’s constitutional commitment to the rule of law.  
